Over the last 20 years or so, Hilary Putnam has developed a series of arguments which use basic theorems of model theory to undermine semantic realism. Here, I discuss two generalizations of these arguments. The first employs some new forms of model theory to generate substantially stronger conclusions than Putnam's original arguments generated. The second illustrates a method for replacing the model theory in Putnam's arguments with results from other branches of science-in particular, with results from astronomy. Now, I should say at the outset that neither of these new arguments is supposed to be persuasive: each of them fails, and fails rather badly, when regarded as a serious objection to realism. Nevertheless, the arguments serve three purposes. 
Hence, just as theoretical contraints are unable to fix the intended interpretation of our language, so also are theoretical and operational constraints unable to do so. 3 This gives us an initial premise in Putnam's argument. Using "theoretical and operational constraints" in the sense just indicated, we have:
1. Theoretical and operational constraints do not fix a unique "intended interpretation" of our language.
Further, Putnam thinks that theoretical and operational constraints are the only things which could fix the intended interpretation of our language. His reasons for thinking this are complicated and lie at the heart of some controversial interpretive questions; I will return to them in sections 2 and 3. For now, I simply take this claim as given and continue with the central argument:
2. Nothing other than theoretical and operational constraints could fix the "intended interpretation" of our language.
So, 3. There isn't a unique "intended interpretation" of our language.
Here, 1-3 constitute the core of Putnam's model-theoretic argument. They show (purportedly) that our language has many different "intended interpretations" and that these interpretations are fixed by-and only by-the sum total of our "theoretical and operational constraints."
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Let me note two things about this core argument. First, once the core argument is in place, Putnam can (and does) go on to argue for more detailed conclusions. He argues that realism is false (because realists are committed to the claim that there is a unique intended interpretation for our language). 5 He argues that ideal theories-i.e., theories which are consistent, simple, elegant, etc.-must also be true theories (because a theory is true if it's true on its intended interpretation, the thing which makes an interpretation intended is the satisfaction of "theoretical and operational constraints," and every ideal theory has some interpretation which satisfies the relevant theoretical and operational constraints). 6 Finally, he argues that realists are committed to the rejection of naturalism (because the only way to evade premise 2 in the core argument involves appealing to mysterious, non-natural properties of the mind and/or world).
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Second, these more detailed arguments should be viewed as extensions of the core argument. The core argument-or something very close to it-underlies these more detailed developments of Putnam's thought, and the machinery used in the core argument is essential to the success of these other arguments. If the core argument fails, therefore, and if Putnam's model-theoretic machinery can't do what he thinks it does, then Putnam's more detailed arguments will fail as well. In the next two sections, I will show that the core argument does, indeed, fail.
The Supermodel Argument
To motivate our first extension of Putnam's argument, it's useful to consider an old-and, by now, a relatively notorious-defense of premise 2 in the core argument. This defense, which is typically called the "just more theory" defense, rests on a single key idea: that the phrase "theoretical constraints" is broad enough to encompass philosophical semantics as well as mathematics and natural science. In particular, the defense insists that any philosophical account of how our language gets its intended interpretation should itself be viewed as a new theoretical constraint. So viewed, no such account will enable us to evade the argument for premise 1. Since Putnam can always find an assortment of models which satisfy both our original theoretical constraints and our new philosophical semantics, the philosophical semantics cannot give our language a unique intended interpretation.
In effect, then, the just-more-theory defense claims that any mechanism which seems to fix the intended interpretation of our language turns out, upon reflection, to be a special case of the "theoretical and operational constraints" mentioned in premise 1. As a result, any purported counterexample to premise 2 has already been dealt with by the argument for premise 1. So, by simply adopting a particularly flexibleand a somewhat colonistic-reading of the phrase "theoretical constraints," Putnam ensures that no rival mechanism for fixing intended interpretations needs to be taken seriously.
Now
, before examining what's wrong with this just-more-theory defense, I want to make two preliminary comments about it. First, it's worth emphasizing just how often Putnam has employed this defense. 8 We have, in effect, already seen it used to deal with "operational constraints" (which got interpreted, not as concrete observations of specific physical phenomena, but instead as mere sentences to be added to our overall theory). Similarly, Putnam has used the defense to defuse the suggestion that causal constraints help to pin down the intended interpretation of our language (arguing that the entire causal theory of reference should be regarded as "just more theory" and appended to our set of theoretical constraints). 9 Finally, Putnam has used the defense to deal with some technical objections involving modal and higher-order logics.
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Second, we should note that most realists have strongly resisted this just-more-theory defense. Their basic objection can be formulated in model-theoretic terms. 11 We begin by drawing a distinction between specifying the type of model theory to be used in interpreting our current theoretical constraints and simply adding new theoretical constraints to be interpreted using whatever type of model theory Putnam himself happens to prefer. Realists often want to do the former: e.g., when they specify that we should use a modal or second-order satisfaction relation, or when they suggest that we should limit ourselves to models whose interpretation functions respect certain kinds of causal constraints. Putnam's just-more-theory defense, however, systematically reinterprets them as doing the latter-as simply adding new sentences to be interpreted using Putnam's favorite model theory. On the realists' view, this reinterpretation constitutes an illicit-and a somewhat perverse-misconstrual of their overall position.
To evaluate the realists' objection here-and to show more generally why the kind of reinterpretation at issue in the just-more-theory defense is way too powerful to be plausible-I turn to my first new argument.
Following Putnam, assume that we have expressed our "theoretical and operational constraints" as a set of first-order sentences. Let G be a model whose domain contains only one thing-my cat Gandalf-and which interprets all relations as maximal (i.e., which makes every n-ary relation, R(x 1 , . . . , x n ), true at all n-tuples from G). Finally, let |= g be a "satisfaction" relation which agrees with the ordinary first-order satisfaction relation, except that it interprets negation as a redundant operator. That is, let the recursion clause for "¬"
in the definition of |= g read as follows: for any model N, any assignment of variables ν, and any first-order For such theories, it might seem that Putnam should use modal models to generate his "intended interpretations"; if so, then the Löwenheim-Skolem theorems might not apply. Higher-order logic comes into play when we consider second-order formulations of set theory (to which the Löwenheim-Skolem theorems certainly don't apply).
Putnam deals with these concerns on pp. 8-9 and 23 of [16] . In the modal case, he suggests that we "first-orderize" our counterfactual talk-i.e., that we reformulate such talk in terms of a new "subjunctively necessitates" predicate and then add (first-order) axioms governing this predicate to our overall theory. In the second-order case, Putnam uses Henkin models to the same effect. (Essentially, Henkin models provide a way of "first-orderizing" second-order theories: they treat second-order theories as if they were simply first-order theories with extra axioms governing the relevant second-order constructions.)
In both cases, therefore, Putnam employs a version of the just-more-theory strategy. The realist wants his theory to be interpreted using a certain kind of semantics-one which will fix his theory's interpretation more tightly than Putnam's modeltheoretic semantics would. Putnam responds by transforming descriptions of the realist's semantics into collections of first-order sentences, and then insists that we interpret these sentences using his own preferred, first-order semantics.
formula φ,
Given these definitions, it's straightforward to show that G |= g φ for any φ in our language. 12 So, if we understand "satisfaction" after the manner of |= g , then it turns out that G satisfies absolutely everything.
Now, since G satisfies absolutely everything, it clearly satisfies all of our theoretical and operational constraints. This lets us run the following argument (which I will dub the "supermodel argument"):
1 . Theoretical and operational constraints do not commit us to the existence of more than one object (my cat Gandalf).
2 . Nothing other than theoretical and operational constraints could commit us to the existence of more than one object.
So, 3 . Nothing commits us to the existence of more than one object.
Here, a simple modification of our understanding of negation allows us to generate surprisingly strong results.
From a metaphysical perspective, the argument shows that we have no ontological commitments to objects other than my cat. From a semantic perspective, the argument shows that nothing about our use of language prohibits all singular terms from referring to Gandalf and all predicates from applying to Gandalf (e.g., the name "Spot" and the predicate "is a Dog").
Clearly, something has gone wrong here. I suggest, however, that if we accept Putnam's just-more-theory defense, then it's hard to see what has gone wrong. There are two things to note. First, the just-more-theory defense can be used to defend the supermodel argument against exactly the same criticisms as were raised against Putnam's argument. Consider any mechanism which purports to fix the intended interpretation of our language, and, in particular, which purports to rule out the interpretation given by G and |= g . Following
Putnam, the defender of the supermodel argument can simply insist that a description of this mechanism be added to our overall collection of theoretical constraints. Since G satisfies everything, G continues to satisfy these expanded constraints. Hence, the mechanism at issue doesn't really rule out G after all.
Second, the just-more-theory defense can be used to defend the supermodel argument against some more-specific criticisms that might be directed against it. Someone might, for instance, complain that the supermodel can't give the intended interpretation of our language because it contains only one thing (while it is clear that we intend to talk about more than one thing!). But, while it's certainly true that the supermodel 12 The argument for this claim is a straightforward induction on the structure of φ. The fact that G contains only one element, along with the fact that all relations are maximal, ensures that G "satisfies" all atomic formulas. Given this, the passage through binary connectives is trivial (since standard binary connectives map (T, T ) to T ). Similarly, the fact that negation is redundant allows us to move from G |=g φ to G |=g ¬φ. Finally, because G contains only one object,
; so, passage through quantifiers is simple.
It's worth noting that this construction doesn't really depend on the fact that we're working with a first-order language.
Trivial modifications will let us prove the result for modal or higher-order languages. Nor must we apply Putnam's strategy of "first-orderizing" such languages in order to obtain this preservation result (although it does make things somewhat easier).
contains only one thing, it's also true that the supermodel "satisfies" the formal sentence which expresses the condition "contains more than one thing." That is,
Similarly, someone might complain that |= g violates the principles of bivalence and excluded middle. Again, though, the supermodel does satisfy the formal versions of these principles. For any φ,
Hence, as long as we follow Putnam and view conditions on interpretations-i.e., specifications or partial specifications of the model theory under which certain sentences are to be interpreted-as mere "theoretical constraints" to be interpreted using our own favorite model theory, we can save the supermodel argument from the most natural criticisms that could be leveled against it.
On the surface, this all suggests that something has gone badly wrong with Putnam's just-more-theory defense. If the defense provides adequate support for premise 2 in Putnam's model-theoretic argument, then, by parity of reasoning, it should also provide adequate support for premise 2 in the supermodel argument. But, the supermodel argument is clearly unsound, and the just-more-theory strategy doesn't provide adequate support for premise 2 . So, it doesn't provide adequate support for premise 2 either. Now, as it stands, this parity-of-reasoning argument may seem somewhat flippant. So, I'd like to slow down a bit and examine the serious philosophical point which the supermodel argument is supposed to bring out. I'll start with five general observations. First, at the most basic level, Putnam's model-theoretic argument turns on the fact that certain sentences-or sets of sentences-don't pick out unique models for themselves. Second, it only makes sense to talk about sentences "picking out" models against the backdrop of a fixed background semantics-i.e., a fixed conception of what counts as a model and a fixed "satisfaction" relation that ties sentences to models. Third, there are many different kinds of semantics which could, in principle, play this background role: propositional semantics, first-order semantics, second-order semantics, semantics with built-in causal constraints, etc. Fourth, Putnam's model-theoretic argument depends on making some fairly specific choices about these background semantics (in general, only standard, first-order model theory will do the trick for Putnam). 13 Finally, realists tend to prefer stronger background semantics than those favored by Putnam-i.e., semantics which connect languages to models in ways which preserve 13 Putnam's emphasis on first-order semantics can be be seen most explicitly in his repeated insistence that theoretical constraints be formalized in first-order languages. It can be seen implicitly in his use of model-theoretic results which only apply to first-order theories-e.g., the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem-and in his repeated attempts to reduce strong semantics to first-order semantics-e.g., in the modal and higher-order cases discussed in footnote 10.
In fairness, I should note that some versions of Putnam's argument-the permutation arguments, in particular-work for a broader class of background semantics, including higher-order semantics. Still, they're pretty restrictive: they don't work for semantics with built-in causal constraints, and they probably don't work for modal semantics either. See [4] Of course, it's not just supermodel semantics which work here. We could make a similar point using propositional semantics, or we could invoke the purely stipulational semantics given by "M-Γ-satisfaction" (where N |= M,Γ φ ⇐⇒ Def N = M and φ ∈ Γ). The argument now rests on the more-or-less trivial observation that if you get to reinterpret anything you want, any way you want, then you can make any sentences you want true under any circumstances you want.
We didn't need fancy model theory to tell us that.
In the end, then, I don't think that Putnam can plausibly respond to the supermodel argument by simply accepting that argument's implications (treating it, in effect, as a friendly amendment to his own model-theoretic argument). Instead, I think that Putnam needs to give an explicit argument for the special status of first-order model theory. That is, he needs to show that there's something special about first-order model theory which makes it theoretically significant that various theories can be recast in first-order terms, but there's no equivalent "something" which would make supermodel semantics theoretically significant.
This would explain why it's philosophically legitimate for Putnam to reduce the realist's strong semantics to his own first-order semantics, but illegitimate for me to continue this reduction all the way to supermodel semantics (or propositional semantics, or |= M,Γ -semantics, or . . . ).
In practice, this second line requires Putnam to show that first-order model theory is, in some fairly strong sense, semantically normative. Among all the possible background semantics which we could use for interpreting our language, first-order model theory is-and is uniquely-the right semantics for us to use.
Let me make three points about this position. First, it's important to emphasize just how strong this position really is. To avoid the supermodel argument, Putnam needs to assume that first-order logical constants like ¬, → and (perhaps) ∃ have fixed interpretations which are given by the first-order satisfaction relation.
Hence, anything which can be defined in terms of these constants will also have a fixed (though derivative)
interpretation. But that's all that gets a fixed interpretation. Things which can't be defined in purely logical terms-i.e., all of the non-logical predicates and relations in our language-are simply indeterminate; they just have one interpretation in some intended models, and another interpretation in others.
In effect, then, this line commits Putnam to a fairly strong form of logicism-not just logicism about mathematics, but logicism about zoology, logicism about astronomy, logicism about auto mechanics, etc.
Clearly, this isn't a very popular position in the literature; nor, for reasons that we'll discuss below, is it a position that I myself see much hope of seriously defending. Still, I think it's the position that Putnam has to defend if he wants his larger model-theoretic argument to have any real philosophical bite. For convenience, I'll dub this position "global logicism."
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This brings me to a second point. As far as I know, Putnam has never actually tried to defend the kind of global logicism that his just-more-theory defense now seems to depend on. As I noted earlier (p. 8, n. 15),
Putnam's formulations of the just-more-theory defense don't go much beyond the simple observation that he can reduce various kinds of strong semantics to first-order, model-theoretic semantics. So, there's nothing in Putnam's own writing which would explain how he intends to defend the rather radical position on which the just-more-theory defense now seems to rest (nor, indeed, is there anything which indicates that he even recognizes the need for such a defense).
Finally, I think it's highly unlikely that this particular position could be given an adequate defense. On the surface, global logicism looks like a pretty loopy philosophical position. Further, and as I've argued elsewhere, it's a position that's subject to some deep internal tensions (since the set-theoretic machinery that's needed to define notions like model and satisfaction can't itself be specified in purely logical terms).
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Hence, I'm inclined to think that there just isn't any good reason for accepting the kind of global logicism that's needed to make Putnam's just-more-theory defense cogent. 16 Three comments are in order here. First, it's sometimes suggested that Putnam's model-theoretic argument tells against a view called "global descriptivism," the view that the intended interpretation of our language is simply that interpretation which best "fits" with our overall patterns of linguistic usage. I think that this is somewhat misleading. Global descriptivism is really a family of views which differ in the ways they flesh out the notion of an interpretation "fitting" our usage. And these differences matter here. If "fit" can be specified any way we want, then things like the supermodel will count as intended interpretations of our language, and global descriptivism will look pretty silly. If "fit" is specified more tightly-say, by building Lewis-style eligibility constraints and/or some version of the casual theory of reference into our specification-then the model-theoretic argument doesn't get any traction. The only way the model-theoretic argument can play a non-trivial role in countering global descriptivism, therefore, is if our notion of "fit" is itself specified in model-theoretic terms. In short: the only version of global descriptivism that Putnam's model theory really tells against is the version I'm calling "global logicism."
Second, global logicism goes well beyond the simple Quinean demand that we use first-order quantifiers to make our ontological commitments explicit. After all, the supermodel works just fine with first-order languages, and it even interprets first-order quantifiers in a standard fashion. More importantly, Quine's strictures are supposed to be compatible with the notion of a "fully interpreted first-order language"-i.e., a language which has a first-order quantificational structure but in which the other (non-logical) terms, predicates and relations also get fixed interpretations. In contrast, global logicism only fixes the interpretations of those terms, predicates, and relations which can be defined using purely logical machinery.
Finally, I should note that even those versions of Putnam's argument which apply to non-first-order languages-e.g., the permutation arguments-still retain this logicist character (though they allow a richer variety of background logical machinery).
In general, it's the model-theoretic nature of Putnam's argument which forces him to accept some form of logicism.
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To sum up, then, Putnam's just-more-theory defense requires him to walk a very fine line between the kinds of strong semantics which realists would like to use to rebut his argument and the kinds of weak semantics which threaten to trivialize his argument. Putnam himself has never explained why this particular line is philosophically significant; nor do I see any good prospects for developing such an explanation. I'll end this section, therefore, by simply issuing a challenge to Putnam and his defenders:
Provide a version of the model-theoretic argument which makes that argument seem compelling without, at the same time, making the supermodel argument equally compelling.
3 The Astronomical Argument.
In this section, I turn to a second new argument. To motivate this argument, it's once again useful to look at a relatively simple defense of premise 2 in the core argument. This defense-which I will call the "no-explanation" defense-rests on two key observations. First, realists need a plausible account of how reference is supposed to work. If we maintain, for instance, that the truth of a sentence like "the cat is on the mat" depends on the fact that a particular cat is on a particular mat, then we seem to need an account of how "cat" relates to our cat and "mat" to our mat.
Second, realists have yet to provide a plausible account of reference. Although such an account is necessary for realism, and although this necessity has been obvious for some time, no attractive candidates-at least by Putnam's lights-have yet been put forward. Until such candidates are forthcoming, therefore, we should
give provisional support to premise 2. In short: realists' obvious need for an explanation of reference, combined with their continuing failure to provide such an explanation, should lead us to the conclusion that no such explanation is ultimately possible.
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Now, before I examine what's wrong with this defense, it's worth saying something about its history.
As far as I can tell, this defense of premise 2 wasn't used in Putnam's original presentations of the modeltheoretic argument (i.e., those in [14] , [15] , and [16] ). It is, however, the defense which he's adopted more recently (see [19] , [20] , and especially [18] has, over time, become an integral part of that argument.
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To see what's wrong with the no-explanation defense, let's turn to our second new argument. This argument-which I call "the astronomical argument"-starts with a basic result of modern astronomy:
there is no intelligent life on Mars. Given this, we can easily generate the following:
1 . Little green Martians do not fix a unique "intended interpretation" of our language.
2 . Nothing other than Martians could fix the "intended interpretation" of our language.
So, 3 . There isn't a unique "intended interpretation" of our language.
There are three things to notice about this argument. First, and most obviously, the astronomical argument looks strikingly similar to Putnam's own core argument. The two arguments have the same conclusion, they have (essentially) the same logical structure, and their initial premises are both true. 21 The only significant difference is that the astronomical argument eliminates Putnam's model theory and replaces it with some more accessible results from astronomy.
Second, this replacement doesn't have any effect on the no-explanation part of Putnam's argument. After all, the no-explanation defense says nothing specific about the "theoretical and operational" constraints mentioned in Putnam's premise 2. It simply observes that presently-available accounts of reference-fixing don't stand up to philosophical scrutiny, and then infers that future accounts will also prove inadequate.
Given this, replacing talk of "theoretical and operational constraints" with talk of "little green Martians"
should have no effect whatsoever on the cogency of the no-explanation defense. Indeed, the no-explanation defense is so general that it should work with any version of premise 1-with that from the astronomical The idea that it is something other than operational and theoretical constraints that singles out the right reference relation . . . is an incoherent idea. ( [18] , 215)
The supposition that even an 'ideal' theory (from a pragmatic point of view) might really be false appears to collapse into unintelligibility. ( [14] , 126)
The 'Löwenheim-Skolem paradox' is an antinomy, or something close to it, in philosophy of language.
Clearly, however, the no-explanation defense can't justify this talk of "incoherence," "unintelligibility" and "antinomy." At best, it justifies talk of "puzzles yet to be solved" and "phenomena yet to be explained." Hence, whatever independent merits the no-explanation defense may have, the defense introduces tensions into Putnam's overall rhetoric.
argument, that from the zoological argument, that from the quantum-mechanical (or even auto-mechanical) argument, etc.
Finally, given points one and two, the astronomical argument creates another parity-of-reasoning problem for Putnam. If the no-explanation defense provides adequate support for premise 2 in Putnam's argument, then it should also provide adequate support for premise 2 in the astronomical argument. But the astronomical argument isn't a genuine challenge to realism, and the no-explanation defense doesn't make it into one. So, it shouldn't make Putnam's argument into a genuine challenge either. Now, just as before, the somewhat loopy nature of the astronomical argument makes it important to slow down and examine the serious philosophical point which this argument is supposed to bring out. It seems to me that there are two different ways to understand the astronomical argument. First, we could view the argument as a straightforward reductio of Putnam's position. The astronomical argument isn't a serious challenge to realism; so, the no-explanation defense doesn't work; so, premise 2 in Putnam's argument isn't well-supported; etc.; etc. This is the line we'd be inclined to take if we didn't find the no-explanation defense very persuasive in the first place.
Second, and more importantly, we can view the astronomical argument as a tool for highlighting the role that model theory plays-or, more accurately, doesn't play-in Putnam's overall argument. The reason the no-explanation defense works so nicely with the astronomical argument-and its zoological, quantum-mechanical and auto-mechanical cousins-is that the defense says nothing specific about the kinds of reference-fixing mechanisms it's trying to rule out. 22 Instead, it provides an entirely general argument against realist theories of reference. In effect, therefore, the no-explanation defense really amounts to a direct argument for the conclusion of the astronomical argument. To the extent that it supports the astronomical argument at all, therefore, it does so only by rendering the astronomy in that argument irrelevant (i.e., by providing us with an independent and non-astronomical argument for 3 which allows us to bypass all the astronomy used in arguing for 1 ).
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Clearly, this point carries over to the model-theoretic case as well. Once we see that the no-explanation defense provides an independent argument against realism-i.e., an independent argument for 3 and 3 - That is, there's nothing in the basic structure of the no-explanation defense which limits its applicability to non-modeltheoretic accounts of reference-fixing (or non-martian-based accounts, or non-quantum-mechanical accounts, or . . . ).
23 Let me emphasize, here, that I really do think that anyone who accepts the no-explanation defense should also regard the astronomical argument as sound. There shouldn't be anything problematic about this position. Given any sound argument for P, we can always add an extra premise from astronomy/zoology/quantum-mechanics to generate an "astronomical/ zoological/quantum-mechanical argument for P." As long as these new premises are true, the resulting argument will be sound (though it's philosophical significance won't, of course, have very much to do with the new premises we're using to promote it). This brings me to a second point. On the surface, it might seem like Putnam has an obvious response to the astronomical argument, insofar as this argument is pretty clearly a silly argument, while the original model-theoretic argument is, presumably, not so silly. More formally, it might seem like the model theory in Putnam's argument serves to eliminate a genuine candidate for reference-fixing, while the astronomy in the astronomical argument serves only to eliminate a straw man. If this is right, then it might explain why the model-theoretic argument is philosophically significant while the astronomical argument is not.
In effect, this response concedes my claim that the no-explanation defense is doing most of the real work for Putnam, but it suggests that Putnam's model theory still plays a small role in establishing that defense's initial claim-i.e., that "presently-available accounts of reference-fixing are inadequate." In particular, the model theory helps to explain why one particular "presently-available account of reference-fixing" is, in fact, inadequate. The astronomical argument, in contrast, doesn't play even this small role. That's why it's not analogous to the model-theoretic argument.
Now, although this response may be initially attractive, I think it suffers from two, fairly-straightforward problems. First, even if the account of reference ruled out by premise 1 were superficially plausible, it still wouldn't be the account which most contemporary realists have actually tried to defend (as evidenced, for instance, by the responses they've given to Putnam in [4] , [11] , [12] , and [22] Provide a version of the model-theoretic argument which makes that argument seem compelling without, at the same time, making the astronomical argument equally compelling.
Concluding Remarks
In the last two sections, I've examined in some detail the philosophical implications of two different generalizations of Putnam's model-theoretic argument. Here, I want to step back and highlight a few of the broader points which this paper has tried to establish. First, most of the explicit model theory in Putnam's argument comes in his defense of premise 1:
Despite the scientific-sounding reference to "theoretical and operational constraints," this premise doesn't actually engage with theories of interpretation drawn from empirical linguistics. Instead, it serves to rule out a view which I've called "global logicism"-the view that all terms, predicates and relations in our language can be given purely logical definitions. This isn't a view which many philosophers have championed; nor, as far as I can see, is it a view which has much to recommend it. Nevertheless, I think it's the only view on which premise 1 actually gets some philosophical traction.
Second, given the implausibility of the view ruled out by Putnam's premise 1, most of the real work in
Putnam's argument has to occur in his defense of premise 2:
This, after all, is where Putnam takes on all of the theories of reference that other philosophers have actually
proposed. It's also, I would argue, where he takes on all of the plausible theories of reference.
Given all this, it's important for Putnam's defense of premise 2 to retain at least some of the modeltheoretic character of his defense of premise 1. If it doesn't, then it will almost certainly amount to an independent argument against realism and (so) render Putnam's model theory irrelevant. We've already seen how this can happen in the case of the no-explanation defense, and I think that the point generalizes pretty widely. Hence, I think that Putnam's only real option is to provide a genuinely model-theoretic defense of premise 2-preferably, a defense which uses the same kinds of model theory as Putnam used in his defense of premise 1.
Finally, with the exception the just-more-theory defense, I don't know of any defenses of premise 2 which meet this final condition. Unfortunately, as we saw in section 2, the just-more-theory defense is deeply flawed. To keep the just-more-theory defense from slipping into sheer triviality-a la the supermodel argument-Putnam needs to provide a positive argument for global logicism. There's absolutely nothing in his writings, however, which would suggest that such an argument is even possible. I conclude, therefore, that unless Putnam can find some genuinely new-and genuinely model-theoretic-defense of premise 2, his larger argument will continue to strike most philosophers as singularly unconvincing.
